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Penguins of Afghanistan

Penguins of Afghanistan
&
A few Words on Charlie Company

Published: 13 May 2010

There are no birth certificates in these villages.  No death certificates.  No driver’s licenses or addresses or phonebooks, and if there were, few people would be able to read them.  In this mostly illiterate country, there are no paperwork hassles.  Corruption is a problem but bureaucracy and identity theft surely aren’t.  Most Afghans have never been entered into any system.  Like penguins on the ice, they are born, they live and they die, and that’s all.

Whereas most Westerners have been thorougly inventoried by their governments (readers probably have many sorts of IDs ranging from birth certificates to fishing licenses), Afghans are still in the Penguin stage.  They’re just out there doing laps around the sun.  Most don’t know how many laps because they don’t know how old they are, and it’s not because they are orphans but because it doesn’t matter one iota.  A kid can drive when he can drive and shoot when he can shoot.

To take inventory, the military is using systems that soldiers often call “bats and hides,” or, more accurately, BAT and HIIDE, which are two different systems for collecting biometrics.   BAT= Biometrics Automated Toolset, while HIIDE = Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment.  This dispatch is about field usage of the HIIDE system made by www.securimetrics.com.

The HIIDE takes a photo, and software analyzes the face.

Photo, retina scan, fingerprints and text data make a record.

According to Staff Sergeant Jason Hughes, "ZZ Top beards" can inhibit the software from classifying faces, but usually, he says, the image is successful.  If not, soldiers use a separate digital camera to make a photo and add to the record.

Never had an ID card in his life.

Years ago, an old Special Forces team sergeant, Glenn Watson, who did three tours in Vietnam, retired and got a job.

He worked for NEC managing projects that implemented a system called AFIS, or Automated Fingerprint Identification System.  Whenever the chance arose, I would go visit my old team sergeant in Georgia or Pennsylvania where he helped install AFIS for each state.  Bottom line: during visits Glenn gave me grand tours and “briefings” about how the system works.

Some states were digitizing their massive collections of fingerprint files.  Huge amounts data.  There were truckloads fingerprint cards in each state.  In the old days, police would roll fingerprints on the paper cards, but to link a suspect to a latent print, they needed a clue to an actual suspect, and checking had to be done by hand.  So, let’s say a murder occurred and perfect fingerprints were lifted but there was no suspect.  The police might have arrested the murderer years ago for something else, so all his data was on file, but for practical purposes, on a national level, the files were unsearchable.  Law enforcement would have two perfect dots but no way to connect them.

In Atlanta, Glenn showed me a huge room of computer workstations.  The air conditioner kept the place very cold, to the point where all the women (most or all were women) who worked there had to wear sweaters or jackets.  They were scanning fingerprint cards into the AFIS system and entering the personal information into the data fields.  The fingerprints would then pop up on a computer screen (much as seen in these photos with the HIIDE) and the software would do its magic with the minutiae.  I was familiar with minutiae and whatnot from Special Forces training; we learned to fingerprint people and how to read the minutiae.  The upshot in Atlanta was that after the fingerprints were digitized, law enforcement could cross-check all the “latent prints” (prints left at a crime scene) against the entire database.  Glenn said that even as they were still scanning in the truckloads of fingerprint cards, AFIS was getting “hits” on latent prints from crime scenes that were years old.  Crimes that would have gone unsolved were suddenly active.

In Iraq, our people were also using these biometrics capture systems.  Anyone who was detained/arrested was entered, as was everyone who wanted a job with the Coalition.  Data was also collected from bombs, weapons, phones and so forth.  During a police recruitment drive in Anbar Province, the applicants were lined up and I recall one scanned in and there was a hit.  The soldiers quietly detained him away from the others.

When the HIIDE system is brought back to base, or maybe to a sufficently outfitted vehicle, it can be connected to the main system to download/upload.

Each device has internal memory with a database of photos, retina scans and prints.  The computer within the HIIDE will go ahead and scan what is entered against its internal database.  So, as our folks scan people in the villagers, if they were to get a hit that matched a latent print from a bomb or a weapon, say, a message would pop up.  It could say anything that was entered, such as “DETAIN.  Suspected bombmaker,” or, facetiously, “This is Wali Karzai.  Let him go.”

If a man says he does not want to go into the system, that’s fine.  But in return for entering into the system they will be issued an ID card.

Staff Sergeant Jason Hughes sees great value in the HIIDE system and he was also very helpful in writing this dispatch.  It was easy to respect SSG Hughes.  After all, he had been “burned” in a recent Army Times article by the esteemed author Sean Naylor.  SSG Hughes said that Mr. Naylor was accurate and responsible in his portrayal but nevertheless fallout had cost SSG Hughes his job as squad leader.  Many people might have been angry with “the press” after something like that.  Maybe it was all the combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, or maybe Jason Hughes is just not your average man (that much is clear), but he wasn’t afraid of the pen.  There are generals and colonels and command sergeant majors who are afraid of the pen, maybe after having been burned a time or two, but that’s part of the war.  When you get into the fight, you are going to get cut.  Bottom line: keep rolling.  Staff Sergeant Jason Hughes gets it.  He got bucked off and busted up and jumped right back on.

Jason’s first tour in Iraq was with 506th Regimental Combat Team, 101st ABN (Air Assualt), and he was in Baghdad stationed at FOB Rustimiyah as an Assistant Team Leader on a Recon Team from November 2005 to November 2006.  That was all he needed to say and I knew he had seen a lot of combat.  Bad place, bad time.  He came back for more, and now in Afghanistan seems to have the COIN manual memorized and is always ready to talk counterinsurgency, for which he seems to have an intuitive grasp.  After 8 years in the Army, Mr. Naylor’s story came out SSG Hughes was “tactically reassigned” as the NCOIC (noncommissioned officer in charge) of Charlie Company’s Intelligence Support Team, and that’s how he ended up with a HIIDE system in his hands.   SSG Hughes seems dead set on entering every Afghan possible.  That might not help out this rotation much, but the culmulative effect of building the database can generate enormous benefit.

Unfortunately, this is another fragmented dispatch with no clear trajectory other than to mention HIIDE and Charlie company.  Research got cut short after General McChrystal’s gang suddenly broke a written agreement and ended this embed.

My war gone by.

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An Afghan Story

Published: 9 May 2010

If normal life were a river, most days would likely be a slow-moving, meandering passage.  But when a life squeezes into the gorge of war, there can be a deafening whitewater, falls and yet bigger falls, slams against stones, falls again and underwater no air and over the falls again and time stretches and compresses and seems to defy normal experience and over the falls again and you drown or don’t.  Some people come out the other side exhilarated and want to do it again and again, while others are terrified, and yet others will just do what needs to be done.  The persistence of the memories wrought would seem to leave clocks drooped over limbs or floating away.

From wars grow countless wild stories, many of which are true.  Even a single witness will hear thousands over the years.  Back at home, the retellings can seem vague, distant, and as soulful as a soleless boot.  But when you are in a war zone with civilians or combat troops, some stories might start like, “Be careful here.  This is where Jimmy got blown up,” and there is still a crater and all the branches are blown off a nearby tree.  Later in the day, “Be careful here, bullets sometimes come through that window,” and there are pocks on the walls inside the room.  The retellings are not secondhand, not ancient, but immediate and pressing.  In the wars, stories are road signs to the here and now, and so you seek out stories not for entertainment.  They are not entertaining anyway.  Few people likely would be entertained by the story of their own death.  “This is where the suicide bomber hit,” and you are standing there, knowing lightning makes habits.

Captain Max Hanlin of Charlie Company 1-17th Infantry was living with his soldiers at the Shah Wali Kot District Center in northern Kandahar Province, and he said to me from across the tent that the District Governor for Shah Wali Kot district had some interesting stories that should be told.  We walked out to the perimeter under the watchful eye of a machine gunner in his guardpost, and around the corner to see the District Governor so that something useful could get out.

Along with translator, Captain Hanlin and I walked into the District Governor’s office, and we sat down to tea and a story began.

This comes through translation.

The Shah Wali Kot District Governor is Haji Obidullah Populzai from Nish District.  In Afghanistan, the last name is often the tribe, and so Haji was from the Populzai tribe.  His wife is from Barakzai tribe.  He had five brothers.  Two were killed nearby.  One brother was killed about thirty feet away from where we sat and the other was killed by a roadside bomb.  Captain Hanlin said that the blown-out hulk of the vehicle used to sit where our mess tent is now erected.

Haji said one brother had been District Governor in Khakrez District.  One day he was ambushed and lost thirteen bodyguards but they had killed four Taliban.  “Why did Taliban attack your brother?” I asked.  Haji said they attacked because his brother was working with government.  “Did the Taliban threaten in advance?”  They did not threaten in advance, Haji answered.  “When was this?”  Six years ago in fall time, Haji answered.  “Where were the Taliban from?”   Two were from Arghandab, one from Khakrez and one from Thari, Urozgan.  He didn’t know where the others were from.  “Were any captured?”  Haji said they captured one wounded Taliban and handed him over to NDS at Kandahar City.  “What happened to him?” Haji said he didn’t know.

The NDS is the rough equivalent of our FBI.  Their methods are reputed to be rough.  I’ve asked British and American officers about the reliability of the NDS information.  Most have said NDS is usually spot on.  The NDS have an office about one minute’s walk from here.

The brother who had been ambushed in Khakrez was killed in a roadside bombing, Haji said, just near here.  Nine family members were also killed, and that was the hulk that used to be located where the current chow tent is located.

And so that was Haji’s retelling of his first killed brother.

“How was your second brother killed?” I asked.  A suicide bomber, in this building.  There was no bombing damage so this was curious but I decided to save that.  “Why was he killed?”  Revenge.

“Why the revenge?”

Haji answered that the Taliban Commander Abdul Hadi, who is Kuchi, attacked this district center one night about four years ago.  They were fighting all night, for hours and hours, and they killed twelve Taliban.  “Were you fighting too?”  Haji said of course he was firing too.  “Was anyone in the District Center hurt?”  Nobody was hurt.  The checkpost just outside the wire was taken.  “Did you get the Taliban bodies?”  No.  Taliban took the bodies.  “How do you know you killed twelve?”  Some weapons and much blood was left behind and villagers saw them.  “And so they killed your brother in revenge for losing twelve in this attack?”  Yes.

About three months later revenge came in the form of a young man disguised as a begger.  He had a prosethic leg and it was filled with explosives.  Haji’s brother was about thirty feet from where we now were sitting.  Haji was down in Kandahar City, he said, and called a friend who was standing just here in this room, talking to Haji on the phone.  The friend’s AK-47 was up against the wall just outside this room.  The assassin was already in the building.  Just after Haji hung up the phone, the assassin picked up the AK-47, walked the few steps around the corner and shot his brother in the head.  Six bullets were fired.  A guard jumped on the suicide bomber and his leg broke off and they found the explosives.  Wires ran from the leg up his side but they tore away.

I asked many questions about the assassin.  He was Kuchi from Sulimankhail subtribe of the Khilji Tribe.  Through the translator, Haji said they beat him for three days, and the assassin admitted that the target actually was the District Governor who was in Kandahar City so he shot Haji’s brother instead.  “What did you find on him?”  The assassin had nothing in pockets.  During the torture he admitted he did those things for money, and admitted that the Taliban commander was paying him only to commit revenge and this was his first time.  The translations were getting confused.  At first the translator said that after the interrogation Haji slit the assassin’s throat.  So I asked, “You slit his throat.  Did you cut off his head?”  The translator looked a little nervous and said no, and that the assassin was killed on the first day and was killed by the police before Haji arrived back from Kandahar City.

“Where is the body?”  Haji said they left his body outside for two days so the family would come get it but the family was afraid so a third party came and took the body.  Meanwhile, Haji took his brother’s body to Nish District for burial.

“What kind of explosives were in the leg?”  He didn’t know.

“Where is the leg bomb?”  The police gave the leg to Canadians.

“How were the Canadians?”  Haji said he worked with the Canadians and they were supportive.  The Canadians were very good.  I asked if he remembered some Canadian names and he did not remember.  He said there were different groups of Canadians and so there was no permanent group to work with, but they brought various sorts of work and were helpful.

“How much was the assassin paid?”  One million Pakistani Rupees and this was in revenge for the twelve who were killed during the attack.  “But why would a suicide bomber do it for money?  Was the bomb just the back up plan?”  Maybe, Haji answered, I don’t know.  “Can we go see the bullet holes?”  The bullet holes have been repaired.  “What was his name?”  The assassin’s name was Mohammad Sadiq and was about 23 years old.  He was Kuchi and so wasn’t from anywhere in particular.  His father was living in Suznai Village near Arghandab District but still in Shah Wali Kot.  After family found out the son was involved, they moved to Pakistan.

“Is Taliban getting stronger or weaker?”  Haji said the Taliban are 95% weaker since 1-17th got here because 1-17th came when Taliban were in Pakistan for winter.  (This much was told to me by military intelligence, and so Haji added to confirmation that MI were correct.)  And so this is causing Taliban to react to us, Haji said.  He continued that there used to be a lot of ambushes on ISAF, but now the Taliban cannot hang around in large groups, like 25 guys, because Americans will kill them.  They are afraid of the helicopters, Haji said.  He said they plan to strike mostly with mines and suicide attackers, but have not hit with suicide attackers here yet.  They want to hit us again at this district center.  (The U.S. had said the same, possibly with a car bomb.)

“Where do the suicide attackers come from?”  Pakistan, he said.  “Some come from Afghanistan,” I said.  Haji said two suicide attackers had come from his own Nish District.  They were brothers.  “What were their names?”  One was Adam Khan.  Adam blew up in Helmand.  Adam had gone to Peshawar.  His brother Mohammad Jan is still a policeman, Haji said.  Adam’s whole family is in government.  But Adam went to Pakistan when he was 12 and blew up in Helmand when was 17.  Adam’s father is a good man, Haji said.  Mohammad Jan, the policeman, is very sad that his brother became a suicide attacker.

“Do you have children?”  Haji brightened up when talking about his girls.  He said he had three daughters and they are 2, 4 and 6.  The 4- and 6-year-olds are going to school but no school yet for the baby.  Haji said he had 18 children in the house.  The two brothers who were killed had 9 children so he took them, so with Haji’s three that made a dozen.  “That’s only 12 children, where did the other 6 come from?”  I asked many more questions and the summary answer was that in Nish District, he has grapes, pomegranates, black and white cumin, wheat fields, 12 goats, 8 sheep, and a brother has a horse.  His three surviving brothers run the family farm, and he houses their kids so they can go to school.  The oldest of the 18 kids is 15, and the youngest is the 2-year-old girl.  Haji also has the two widows of his dead brothers and Haji said he is the sole breadwinner.  He liked talking about the kids and said they have a dish (satellite receiver for television) and the kids want to watch television but he only allows them to watch it for a short time, and then only sports.  Never the news.

“How do you like having all those kids around?”  I like it, he said, and smiled brightly.

“How is their health?”  The kids are of normal health.

We had to go so the story ended there.

(Happy Mother’s Day!)

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Making the Most of Social Media Marketing – Links

Making the Most of Social Media Marketing – Links.

Making the Most of Social Media Marketing – Links

Written by Colin Welch – 05.01.10

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Below you’ll find a comprehensive list of Social Media Tips, Guides, Plugins, Platforms, Analytics Tools, Apps and other great Social Media resources. This list is designed as a reference guide for delegates who have attended our Social Networking training or SEO training courses – but it would be mean of us not to make it available to everyone. Enjoy…

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Big Guns

28 April 2010

The intention was to write a detailed dispatch on the 3-17th Field Artillerly.  Unfortunately, General Stanley McChrystals’ crew broke an agreement I had with the Army to stay until 5/2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team leaves Afghanistan, and so the research on this dispatch was not completed.  However, there are some nice nighttime photos and so this dispatch is more about Canons than cannons.

The cannons are ultra-accurate.   The commanders are careful with their fire because the guns are also very powerful.  When a “fire mission” comes in, the soldiers use the computer to calculate the shot.  When you watch the soldiers in action, you can see that they must have practiced this a thousand times.  Or more.  They just can’t afford to be wrong, and the people who depend on the cannons sometimes cannot wait – so the soldiers must fast and accurate.

Our people use various sorts of ammunition.  The most accurate is called “Excaliber,” and it’s a GPS guided smart bomb that is fired from these cannons.  The Excaliber is fantastically precise – more accurate than any sniper – and can make first round hits on the targets 5, 10, 20 miles away.  Recently, we (the U.S.) had a software glitch with the Excaliber rounds which would have made them inaccurate within certain calendar dates.  There are still some glitches but there is no doubt that we could use a lot more of Excaliber.  The incredible first-shot accuracy allows our people to more specifically target and reduce civilian casualties.

(I sat on the software information for a couple months until the problem was fixed.)

Daytime photography is somewhat predictable, but nighttime photography is like a box of chocolates.

With the shutter open for up to 30 seconds per photo, moving soldiers appear as apparitions.

Tonight they were firing illumination.  On very dark nights, they sometimes fire IR (infrared) illumination that helps our nightvision gear.

These images came from two cameras.  Both are Canon Mark II 5d, and with the best lenses that Canon sells, the Mark II 5d model using Canon professional lenses is the best “normal” (meaning not nightvision or thermal) gear for night shooting that I’ve ever held.

The sensors on digital cameras are sensitive beyond the visible range, and so the manufacturers install a filter over the sensor that passes only visible light.  I paid a company to remove that filter so the camera will pass IR and some UV.  Some of the photos in this series are with the normal camera, and the other are made with the modified sensor.

The illumination drifts down under parachute and the gun can be seen moving as the soldier take a different aim.  Soldiers don’t call their rifles “guns,” but they call the cannons guns.  Rifles are called either “rifle,” “weapon,” “M4” (or whatever model it is),  but not “gun.”

From the IR box of chocolates.  You just never know what you will get with night photography.

The gun was moved while the shutter was open.  Notice with the modified camera that the stars are a little fuzzy.

Small charge.

The IR flash strobed once during this photo – which lit up the men, but the sun in the background is actually an illumination round.  The IR camera does strange things.

Again the IR flash strobed once.

Again with IR strobe.

IR strobe.

IR strobe.

IR strobe.

And that’s about it.  This was meant to be a full dispatch but General Stanley McChrystal’s crew ended the embed before I could finish the research.  McChrystal is trying to censor the war.  It won’t work.

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Battle for Kandahar

Battle for Kandahar

Baghtu Valley

25 April 2010
Afghanistan

The counteroffensive has begun.  More accurately, it might be called a counter-counteroffensive.  Close to a decade ago, we beat the Taliban and al Qaeda here.  The Taliban regrew and waged an increasingly successful counteroffensive.  And so our ninth year at war is the year of our counter-counteroffensive.

The most remarkable feature of our counter-counteroffensive likely will be the Battle for Kandahar, or BfK.  Kandahar was the birthplace of the Taliban and Kandahar City is the provincial capital.  The Taliban is succesfully wresting Kandahar back into their control.  The BfK is likely our last effort to halt and reverse Taliban influence from spreading.  The winner in the BfK will be set to eventually take most or all of the chips off the table, and so BfK is crucial to the outcome of the war.

Much of the BfK will take place not in Kandahar, or even Afghanistan, but in the mediasphere, and likey will affect U.S. elections this year.  The implications are vast.

This is a political war on nearly every level.  Though this will almost certainly be our most deadly year so far, violence is often a minor aspect of the struggle, while in some places combat is—by far—the most prevalent feature.  Insofar as combat, our plans do not include serious fighting within Kandahar City, though soon after publication of this dispatch fighting will erupt in nearby areas.  BfK is more of a process for both sides than a set battle. The Taliban are succeeding in their process to take Kandahar, and we wish to reverse that process.

(Note: The mission described in this dispatch occurred before General McChrystal’s crew censored my embed.)

The mission for the next couple days was to visit four villages that rarely see Coalition, and never see Afghan government unless villagers travel to the Shah Wali Kot (SWK) District Center or to Kandahar City.

“Route Bear” starts at Highway 1, passes by Arghandab River Valley, by FOB Frontenac, by the district center (where this mostly was written) and on up to Tarin Kot in Urozgan Province.  The Aussies, Dutch, U.S. and others use the route for convoys.  Most of the areas out here are the wild unknowns where no, or almost no, Coalition or Afghan government ever goes.   We know little about the villages.  Route Bear and other roads follow the paths of least resistance while Afghans follow the water.  If you see green down below, it’s safe to bet that Afghans live there.  And so the main routes such as Bear—of which there are few—often are far away from the nearest villages, but within easy distance when Taliban decide to strike.  Even if there were no bombs, our heavy armor cannot get to most villages in Afghanistan, but the Taliban can scoot all over on their motorbikes and light vehicles.

The villages of Shah Tut and Padah, in the Baghtu Valley, are mostly unknown to us.  Some Dutch, however, should remember it well because they have been attacked where Route Bear crosses the Baghtu Valley.  This war has been going on for so long that it’s hard to know what’s happened here.

Charlie Company drove out under cover of morning darkness off Route Bear into the hills a few kilometers from the villages of Shah Tut and Padah.  As the Strykers approached a dangerous chokepoint, far from the villages, the soldiers fired grenades from the Mark 19 (automatic grenade launcher) and some machine gun bursts at potential ambush spots.  It is important to note that there were no civilians or villages in this area but anyone hiding in ambush would likely fire back or flee.  This tactic is sometimes called “recon by fire” and can be very effective.

The soldiers drove to a prearranged area, dropped ramps on the Strykers and began the walk toward the villages.  A lizard and a grasshooper were the only creatures to be seen.  The desolate area is a work of natural art.

First we walked to Shah Tut, situated at about 4,500ft above sea level.  Afghan National Police brought two pickups partially loaded with blankets for the villagers and extra supplies for us to spend the night in the desert, or possibly in an Afghan compound if the commander could rent one for a night.  The soldiers stayed off the roads in case of bombs, but closer to the village the terrain forced the ANP back onto the roads.  The two police walking in front are looking for bombs.

Many Afghan villages share names.  Variant spellings, variant names and same-names are challenging.  In the United States, if someone says they are from Ellijay, Georgia, the location can be quickly narrowed and pinpointed despite that the United States has a population probably ten times greater while geographically dwarfing Afghanistan.  But here, even in the limited “Central Area” of “Regional Command South” comprising part of southern Afghanistan, there are five listed villages called “Padah” or “Padeh” and there are 15 villages named Shin Ghar.  Villages often are named after terrain features.  A Pashtun man explained “padah” is the word for the feature we call a “saddle,” while shin ghar means “blue mountain,” or maybe “green mountain,” depending on who you ask.

Just a couple minutes of scanning the atlas index (RC-South, Central Area, Afghanistan Atlas, produced by the British MoD) reveals replicate names from A to Z.  The atlas covers but a small portion of the country that might approximate north Georgia.  Imagine if there were seven villages named Ellijay, three named Elejey, and two named Elijeya, just in North Georgia, not to mention the rest of the United States.

There are roughly 4,000 named population centers in the the Central Area of RC-South and, for a guess, there might be only 3,200 different names.

Shah Tut means “mulberry” and Shah tut trees are said to live for centuries, though the Taliban sometimes cut down the shah tut trees of uncooperative villages.  During imperial days the British made beer and wine from the fruits, and those fruits are sold in markets today.  It’s possible that some of the still living trees helped make beer for the British last century.

Having avoided any bombs or ambushes, Afghan National Police and soldiers from Charlie Company 1-17th Infantry crested a saddle and saw the Baghtu Valley and the village of Shah Tut.  Soldiers took security position and the governor of Shah Wali Kot District hollered down below asking that village men assemble.  ANP repeated the calls on a megaphone.

From a vantage point on a nearby hill, Charlie Company soldiers could see villagers avoiding certain paths.  Villagers would come to a certain spot, hop over a wall and walk through the field, then get back on the path.  The soldiers on the hill radioed to soldiers who were already in Shah Tut to stay off the paths even inside the village.

The villagers assembled under shade near the dry riverbed.

Captain Max Hanlin, from San Francisco, on his sixth combat tour, sat down with interpreter Daoud, or “Popeye.”   Soldiers call him Popeye because Daoud Khan says he is part owner of some Popeye restaurants back in several New England states.  Interpreters remain a significant weakness for U.S. forces here.  We hire Dari-speaking intepreters from places like Kabul to translate down here, in an area where they understand neither the language nor the culture.   (Language and cultural translation being separate issues.)  Captain Hanlin explained that he has suffered his share of bad interpreters, but Daoud is gold.  His English fluency and  understanding of American culture, and local culture and language are what is needed.  He was born just south of here in the Arghandab.

The men assembled and Captain Hanlin must have spoken with them for a couple hours.  The villagers said they could not defend against the Taliban because President Karzai had taken their weapons.  Captain Hanlin would be hard to pick out as a killer who is on his sixth tour, four of which were with the Rangers who are not known for dropping in to have tea.  A graduate of Duke, his seemingly lighthearted personality didn’t indicate what came next.  Captain Hanlin asked how many Taliban usually come to the village and the men answered just a couple or a few.  And so Captain Hanlin said they have shovels and tools, and look at all these rocks.  Just bash ’em in the head.  Kill them.  Keep their bodies.  Get on a motorbike and come tell us, and we’ll pay you for killing them and there will be no further recourse.  Just kill them.  You have them outnumbered.  The men didn’t seem to bite. 
Cell phone coverage does not exist in Baghtu Valley.  They are on their own.  They might kill the first group, but the one that followed would come for vengence.  Neither we nor the Afghan government can protect them.  Meanwhile, information came in that the Taliban also contacted the village via radio, asking if the villagers attacked us, but a villager responded that they had not attacked us because they “didn’t have anything.”

Meanwhile, just nearby, other soldiers were collecting biometric information with the HIIDE gear.  (Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment.)  The HIIDE takes fingerprint, photo and retinal photo of each fighting-aged male.  In the interest of political correctness for the home audience—which means nothing here—the kids are not entered into the system.

We moved from Shah Tut village to Padah.   Two soldiers counted everyone as we departed.  It’s easy to lose someone even in broad daylight, and so the soldiers often do a head count.  Sergeant First Class Olaf Munch tapped each soldier as they passed through and counted aloud.  It’s probably no exaggeration to say that Olaf and I did a hundred missions together in Iraq.  He’s a well respected soldier and good at his profession.  I was saddened to get the news that Olaf was sent home shortly after this mission for more medical work related to the previous bombs.  Godspeed to Olaf.

We walked  through the farmer’s fields, some of which were growing poppy for opium.  Popeye the interpreter picked some poppy and stopped a young soldier and told him this is where the cocaine, crack, and heroin comes from.  The soldier cracked up as it became apparent that Popeye, though a smart man, had never been in the drug business.

A radio transmission came in.  A bomb had exploded and a soldier had disappeared.  He was “DUSTWUN” (Duty Status Whereabouts Unknown), or missing in action.  MIAs are relatively common in Afghanistan.  Bombs detonate and people disappear.  Sometimes they fly into rivers or off cliffs or simply disintegrate.

The experienced soldiers kept giving me tips on how to not get blown up, and I was listening with both ears.  When going on missions, it’s important to identify the most experienced soldiers and stay close to them during any potential rough spots.  The soldiers also thought something might happen here, so I stayed close to experience.

After the DUSTWUN report, the soldiers counted again and called up that we are all accounted for.  The DUSTWUN occurred in their old Area of Operations, the Arghandab, which was being covered by 2nd Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division.  Staff Sergeant Scott Brunkhorst, 25 years old, was killed in action.

Snipers and Air Force JTACs (who can call airstrikes) were watching our route from vantage points.

The riverbed doubled as a road and the ANPs took the easy route while we stayed in the fields.  An ANP saw something suspicious and started hacking into the ground with his weapon as if it were a pick axe.  Speaks highly of Russian designs, but not so much for ANP training.  After he finished hacking, he banged the barrel against the rock to get out the gunk.

The mortar team consists of three soldiers.  One carries that 60mm tube with a round inside ready to fire.  The morale of that three-man crew had to be high; during any chance they were cutting up about something.  They had the boys in Shah Tut in hysterics by passing gas.  It was challenging at times moving with that mortar.  The soldiers go over the walls because the enemy places bombs on the sides and in openings.

Charlie Company came into Padah.  The men were praying at the mosque so we waited under some fig trees until they finished, and they then invited us to meet outside at the mosque.  It’s common knowledge that Muslims don’t like us in their mosques—but this seems to be common knowledge that is untrue.  Muslims in various countries don’t seem to mind.  They didn’t mind in Iraq, here, Kashmir or other places I’ve been.  They don’t like soldiers coming in with combat in their eyes—that’s a fact.  Many enemies in Iraq and here used that against us and would use mosques as fighting platforms or warehouses.  (If the enemy shoots from a mosque, they will get shot at.)  The Islamic world is vast and so it’s not good to make generalizations.  It can be said that Muslims in many countries do not mind if you come into their mosque any more than Christians mind if you come into their church.  It’s okay so long as you respect their territory.

Captain Hanlin talked about various subjects and drifted over to asking them to use their shovels and rocks to whack any Taliban who came in.  He asked if I had any questions, which turned out to be a mistake.  I asked the villagers about opium production and prices which started an argument between the village elders.  I had no idea what they were arguing about, but it went on for an impressive fifteen minutes, and finally, it was said, that they had settled.  What do they want?  Opium production, or Karzai as President.  An elder said he wanted both.  I smiled at Captain Hanlin, rather sheepishly, and said there are no further questions.

While talking with the elders, an ANP (r) told villagers about the ID cards they can get by going over to the soldiers who are using the HIIDE system.  Many Afghans have never even had their photo taken.  They don’t watch Gary Sinise on CSI New York.  Most seem to want the IDs and so they will line up and give up their fingerprints, photos and retinal images.

The villagers took off their shoes before coming into the praying area.  In many places, the shoes don’t fit.  In this Padah everyone seemed to wear shoes that fit.  The enemy often wears running shoes.  None of the men or boys in the village seemed to have running shoes.

Most of the men had never had their photo taken.

HIIDE systems: Most of the men do not know their ages.  Some of the older men are missing some fingerprints from farm work.

The villages gave up some information about IED(s) on our route out.  The IEDs had been there for at least months, apparently, and the villagers were upset because they had to take a lengthy detour on another road to miss the bomb(s), so they told Captain Hanlin where to find the explosives.

Some Afghans walked straight to a suspected bomb and started digging it out, Hurt Locker style.  The soldiers here think the Hurt Locker movie is trash, and so it’s become an insult to call someone “Hurt Locker.”  I said something like, “Wow, those Afghans must have watched Hurt Locker and now they are going to die.”  The soldiers just laughed and kept doing their work while I hid behind the rocks.

And so Charlie Company walked back to the Strykers and slept in the desert.  The intention was to visit two more villages in the morning, but due to a mine roller breaking on a Stryker, and the Governor also arranged tribal shura to discuss re-integration, we didn’t go to the other two villages.  (Am unsure what people are re-integrating to, but that’s the word used here.  Another strange phrase is “Afghanistan reconstruction.”)

And that was it.

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Under Cover of the Night

Under Cover of the Night

with

1-17th Infantry

11 April 2010

During a mission there is no “pause” button.  It’s on until it’s over.  Recently, Charlie Company 1-17th Infantry conducted a mission that included visiting villages in the Shah Wali Kot district of northern Kandahar Province.

The main threats in this area are bombs and mines.  Many vehicles have “mine rollers” on the front that are designed to detonate the bomb before it gets under the vehicle.  The bombs often are big enough to completely obliterate any tank or armored vehicle ever built.  During the mission, a mine roller on a Stryker broke, causing Charlie Company to overnight in the desert.

After finding a suitable RON (rest overnight) location, the task was security and making a plan for the night.  With a full moon rising the Taliban could easily slip silently through the folds and creases of the land and strike.  The Taliban likely already knew our strength.  Tracks from the heavy Strykers would show our direction of travel, as would villagers along the way.  Of course, if the enemy followed the tracks they would eventually lead to a hail of devastating fire.  Most of the enemies are too smart for such mistakes.  More likely, the enemy would try to anticipate our next move and get bombs in front of our most probable routes.  They had all night.  Our people up that game by pushing out snipers and observers who might be watching the Taliban—even from miles away—ready to kill them on our routes.  Winning and losing deadly little skirmishes depends heavily on expertise, and luck.  We and the enemy have great advantages and disadvantages.

It was dark when the above photo was taken at 9:19PM local.  The moon was bright but the camera lens seemed to vacuum in the light and brightened to look like nearly daylight.  (Image data: 1649Z/2119Lima 50mm f4.5 30s ISO 800.)

With security out, SFC Olaf Munch made a schedule for the sentries while the soldiers dined on MREs and unpacked sleeping bags.  Lights were hardly needed.  Red filters were used because red lights are more difficult to see from a distance and they preserve night vision.

Actual data for the above image includes: 1650Z/2120L 50mm f4.5 30s ISO 800.  The “Z” or “Zulu” suffix denotes GMT or Greenwich Mean Time.  GMT is the time at the Prime Meridian—which runs through Greenwich —and so the image was made at 4:50PM on the 24-hour clock used by the military and others.  The U.S. military deals with every time zone in the world every minute of the day.  I adopted the military’s good idea by setting my cameras to Zulu.  Leaving the cameras on Zulu, it’s not important to remember to change the camera time or wonder if you did.  The  “L” or “Lima” means local time.  Troops might say that “so and so” will happen at “0200 Zulu,” or maybe “0200 Lima.”  Our military has myriad moving parts in different time zones and cannot have everyone operating on local clocks.  The Navy would show up early, the Air Force would show up late, and the Army and Marines would crash into each other.  Imagine the Air Force flying through multiple time zones to parachute supplies to a remote base.  The aircraft might have come in from a thousand miles away, while Air Force HQ might be in a different time zone, and the Marine HQ in another, and the target drop zone in a different zone.  So our people work off Zulu time, and everyone shows up on time.  Usually.

Soldiers who had guard duty crashed quickly.  Some wear boots while sleeping; others dry their feet.  The military sleeping bags have enough footroom to allow for boots.  The sleeping bag zippers are designed to easily rip open.  Soldiers can go from sound asleep to fighting in seconds.
(1657Z/2127L 15mm f6.3 30s ISO 800)

The soldiers don’t walk much in case of land mines or IEDs.  We stay within a small area, dispersed enough for safety, yet close enough to communicate.

No flash is needed.  Only moonshine.

The mortar crew quietly telling jokes after the long day.

With no clouds, the earth radiates heat to outer space and the desert chills quickly, causing the mortar team to pull into sleeping bags.

The M4 rifles must deal with this dust night and day yet the rifles function well.

The Stryker could be heard as the electrically operated .50 caliber scanned for targets.  The only way the enemy could attack us while maintaining a pittance of survivability was with rockets or mortars, but the moment those came in, we’d call aircraft that could arrive in minutes scanning the folds with their thermals.  We also had another Stryker platoon out there in the darkness and they had a 120mm mortar—a devastating weapon with uncanny first-round accuracy.  Whatever the enemy might do, they would need to do without being seen.  We camped in the middle of pure battlefield without the complications of city or village fighting.  If the enemy attacks tonight, their life expectancy plummets to seconds.  Long before we are within range of their weapons, they are within range of sudden precision fire from ours.  The enemy might be able to slip into one of the terrain folds, but there was no easy approach and the thermals on the Strykers and the night vision carried by the men made a successful, direct attack improbable.  And besides, most Taliban are poor shots even in broad daylight.  At nighttime they’d be lucky not to shoot each other.  The enemy is good at some things, but many of us were better shots when we were 14 years old.  If the enemy fired, our men would turn on the invisible lasers on their rifles, peer through night vision that made the lasers appear, and shoot them.  The enemy would need Harry Potter invisibility cloaks to sneak in on us.

During times when there is a good possibility of being attacked, it’s best to not take off more than one boot at a time to let feet dry.  But with such a low probability of being surprised and being surrounded by combat soldiers, it’s fine to take off both boots and keep them close.

11:24 PM, or 2324L.

In the far distance, the artillery can be heard firing illumination before it floats down under parachute.
(1901Z/2331L 15mm f7.1 20s ISO 800)

The Battle for Kandahar has many faces.  Some faces are difficult to understand.  Tonight’s incarnation was simple.

Roving sentry.

Smoke trail from previous illumination.

We see illumination firing pretty much every night and I usually don’t know why they are shooting.  Could be terrain denial, or to support operations, or something else.

They stop shooting.  The night is quiet other than the robot noises from the .50 caliber machine gun scanning with thermal imager.  Several times through the night, Strykers turn on motors for ten or fifteen minutes to recharge batteries.

Sleeping in the desert, even on rocks, can be like sleeping in a cradle.  Desert slumber is better than most jungle sleep, and far better than in snow caves.  The distant boom from a cannon wakes me, then the pop of the shell before the orange illumination, and then another is fired after the first burns out.  Looking at my watch it’s 3AM and I chuckle thinking of the lyrics of a song, “It’s 3AM I must be lonely.”  This sure has been a long war.
(2233Z/0303L 15mm f10 30s ISO 640)

On Saturday, 10 April, a message came from military that this embed has ended.  No reason was offered.  The troops here have no idea why.  On Sunday a reason was given: overcrowding by journalists.  Haven’t seen a journalist in weeks.

I had gone to great expense to be here with 5/2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team and promised to stay with them until they leave Afghanistan.  Then suddenly a nameless feature decided to pull the plug.  The decision likely came from General officer level.  It is a bad sign indicating that they think they are losing the war and don’t want anyone there to see it.  Saw this in Iraq.

It has been said that between Iraq and Afghanistan I’ve spent more time embedded with combat units than anyone in U.S. history.  I do not know if this is true but it sounds good.  It’s been a long journey and fortune favored my every step.  Many people have been killed or maimed and I am walking out without a scratch.  I will continue to cover the war but will not give the military another chance to pull the plug.  I will cover the war from outside the wire where it’s far safer.  Many people erroneously think that embedding is the safest way to cover the wars.  This is untrue.  Journalists who are afraid or reluctant to endure long periods of stress and combat will brag that going alone somehow seizes the high ground of truth.  There is no truth in this.  In many cases the journalists are missing crucial information because they fear the combat and the difficult living.  The infantry company on this mission has lost twelve comrades KIA during this tour, with others wounded for life.

It’s just as easy to accurately sense the direction of the war winds alone as with troops.  The military media machine is playing games during a time of war.

My thoughts will always be with the combat soldiers.  My body will be elsewhere.

A new day begins at 0531L.  It’s time to check the boots for poisonous creatures, stuff the sleeping bag, and move out.

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Village Boys

Easter Sunday, 2010
Anywhere, Afghanistan

Back in December, C-Co  1-17th Infantry battalion had been in about the worst place in Afghanistan.  There is stiff competition for the position of actual worst place, and I am sure there are many contenders that remain unknown, but the Arghandab was one of them.  The battalion had lost more than twenty soldiers, and C-co alone had lost 12 with more wounded.  In December 2009, C-Co was moved north into Shah Wali Kot and has been running missions here for more than three months.  I’ve only been at Shaw Wali Kot for a week.

Charlie Company headed on a mission to visit villages that had seen no formal western guests for at least the past five years, according Company Commander Max Hanlin.  The soldiers drove to an area maybe two kilometers from the first village, parked, and walked in.  The surrounding desert was so dry that only the hardy and small plants survived—often with thorns, and probably foul-tasting (and poisonous).  How else can a plant expect to survive when the favorite Afghan meat is mutton, and foraging isn’t easy for the lambs?  There was the occasional brown lizard or grasshopper, but on the whole it’s simply rocky desert.  The place is barren but not entirely lifeless.

Charlie Company was heading into the Baghtu Valley.  The general area is said to be among the most religiously conservative in Afghanistan, meaning soldiers were unlikely to stumble across any undiscovered steeples, stupas or synagogues.

Some Charlie Company soldiers are multi-tour combat veterans of Afghanistan and Iraq.  Captain Max Hanlin, the Charlie Company Commander, is on his sixth combat tour.  Captain Hanlin explained how Dutch convoys had been hit near the Baghtu Valley and how fights had raged. Captain Hanlin said the four villages we were to visit are a black hole.  We know where they are, their names, and little more.

We knew nothing, really, about the villages ahead.  We didn’t know whether they are friendly, enemy or neutral.  In fact, the villages could be in another category: beyond neutral.  Just out of it, living in a knowledge vacuum, maybe hoping not to be dragged into a fight.  That would describe much of Afghanistan.

With the Battle for Kandahar kicking off, and our troops surging in for the counteroffensive, villages previously beyond the periphery of our effective reach are becoming more accessible.  Many of them have been Taliban-controlled.  We don’t always know whether these isolated, dusty mud-walled places support, provide sanctuary, or are the native home of Taliban fighters.  The Afghanistan government remains absent from most Afghan villages.  The central government hidden away in Kabul still offers zero.  Not juice, justice or security.  The Taliban at least offers justice in some areas.

And so Charlie Company, some Afghan police, and Haji Oboyadulah Popal (the governor of Shah Wali Kot district), headed to the hills.

Veterans watch the kids.  If the kids don’t like you, or are afraid: bad.  The adults can lie all day and might get away with it, while kids are a collective polygraph.  If the kids disappear suddenly, it’s a good idea to prepare to fight, and it’s always great to see a bunch of young ones return a smile.  Children also see the enemy just like everyone else does, though the children can be more likely to say something.

The soldiers walked into the first village.  One kid looked as if he had been whacked in the head.  A medic bandaged him up.  I asked what happened and through an interpreter the kid said he fell but he seemed to be lying.  The boy just behind him has a slingshot hanging around his neck, as did many of the boys.  Probably got whacked in the head during a slingshot battle and lied to his dad about it, the way we used to lie about BB gun wars.

Does he look innocent?  The boys use the slingshots to hunt birds, which they say they eat, but it’s difficult to imagine that boys with slingshots would not shoot at each other.

Boys catch birds.  And they kept shoving this one up so I would keep looking at it.

An interpreter said they will hold the bird until it becomes accustomed to being held.  When the boy fed the bird, he would slightly release it.

Numerous villagers had watches, and they had shoes.  All the shoes seemed to fit.  In truly poor areas (“poor” being subjective on many fronts),  Afghans often wear shoes that are too large or small.  It’s good to watch for men wearing running shoes, which can be a sign they are fighters.  The British teach this in their man-tracking school that I attended last year in Borneo.  The village was lush with this year’s first crop, including fig trees, and poppy which mostly had not yet flowered.

For the first hour or so, no girls were to be seen, but the boys wanted their photos taken.  Many villagers have never had their photos taken.  The boys didn’t seem to know what the camera was until they saw their images.  Soldiers and Marines sometimes carry Polaroid Cameras to villages.  The villagers love to get the shots which often are the only photos they have ever owned.

Finally a lone girl came out.  She wandered around for some time and a boy showed her to me, and when I lifted the camera he even shielded her eyes, but a moment too late.  This was the first instance I saw anyone care if a young girl was photographed.  Even the girl is covering her face.

There was a meeting going on with Captain Hanlin and the elders and the boys were well-behaved with them, but they were angling for attention.  The boys would have been fun if there were no meeting.  We could have started a slingshot competition.  But they were getting to be a pain.  They magically disappeared and soon were crowded around the mortar team maybe 30 meters away.  The crowd of boys began laughing so loudly that the meeting stopped a couple times to see what was up.  The British will designate a soldier to be the comedian during missions.  When kids disrupt soldiers, the comedian can distract them away from business.  Our folks were borrowing that good idea.  I walked over and asked our guys how they had lured the kids away.  Why were they laughing so loud?  A soldier answered that they didn’t try to entertain the boys.  He continued, “I just farted and they went crazy.”  So he did it again and so on.  The soldier boys with the mortars were getting along famously with the village boys.  Who knew that public corporeal depressurization is a great taboo in Afghanistan, but incredibly entertaining when done by Americans?

Unfortunately, the circus de flatulance ended and the village boys came back to the meeting.

And kept being boys.

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RED HORSE

RED HORSE
in the
Desert of Death

Some troops in Afghanistan go months without a shower.  Major Ryan O’Conner, XO of the 1-17th Infantry, now in Kandahar Province, said that during a previous tour his Soldiers fought half a year without so much as a dip in a creek.  Shortages of drinking water affected combat operations.

For centuries, Afghans have dug underground irrigation tunnels called karez.  The lines of craters in the photo above are shafts into a karez system.  The shafts, which can be hundreds of feet deep, are used to lift out soil and stone while digging a karez.  Karez can take years to build and are sometimes miles long.  They are described as intricate constructions, often built by teams for hire, using father-to-son knowledge passed down through the centuries.

Thousands of handmade underground irrigation systems range from China, through Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, down to Africa, up to Europe and around to the Americas.

In Afghanistan, during many wars, such as with Alexander the Great, the British, the Soviets, and today, karez have been used to hide villagers, fighters and weapons, or to move without detection.

RED HORSE
(Red Horse Deployable Heavy Operations Repair Squadron Engineers)

Water logistics is a high hurdle for Afghans, invaders, liberators and social shapers. Even upon my flimsy, unvarnished plywood desk are three bottles of water with three different labels:

Bottle #1 is labeled “Kinley Clean & Clear Drinking Water: A Quality Product of The Coca-Cola Company.”

Bottle #2, “Cristal Quality Mineral Water” from “Afghanistan Beverage Industries Ltd. Kabul, Afghanistan.”

Bottle #3, “Masafi Pure natural mineral water from the foothills of the Masafi Mountains,” bottled in the U.A.E. and with a website, www.masafi.com.

The showers have signs that say things like:

Combat Showers Only
Limit, three minutes
How to take a combat shower
1) Turn on water
2)    Wet body
3)    Turn off shower
4)    Soap and scrub
5)    Turn on water
6)    Rinse off Soap
7)    Done

FOB Frontenac happens to be nearby the Dala reservoir, created by the Dala Dam, which was created by Americans a couple generations ago.  Unfortunately, most of the larger bases aren’t blessed with reservoirs.  At Frontenac, a local Afghan contractor is paid to take water from the lake reservoir—now gushing from snowmelt—and recharges the holding reservoir on base for the toilets and showers.

FOB Frontenac is a short helicopter leap from the international airport at Kandahar Airfield, where even 747s land.  Today, in just about the middle of Frontenac, a tall water-drilling rig with an American flag flapping in the noonday breeze signaled that someone was drilling for liquid for freedom.  Freedom from the incredible logistics nightmare.  (Or at least a little freedom.)

The drillers are from the Air Force “809 RED HORSE.”  Four Air Force water-drilling crews and have been alternating on six-month tours to Afghanistan, having drilled thirteen wells.  There are two RED HORSE drilling crews per rotation in Afghanistan.  Seabees and others also are out there poking for water.

The crew lead is Tech Sergeant Nathan Laidlaw.  TSgt Laidlaw explained that after RED HORSE crews begin drilling, they work 24/7 without a break; every hour spent on the hole is an hour that something could go wrong, causing wasted effort.  The eight-man crew splits into two, and each works a 12-hour shift.  Their improvised gym, just next to the rig, includes a steel rod with chains wrapped around each end for weight.  Looks like something that Fred Flintstone might use.

This crew’s deepest well in Afghanistan was 1,260 feet at FOB Wolverine.  TSgt. Laidlaw said they worked 45 days straight and finally got the water.  Laidlaw also said that RC-East (Regional Command East) produces far more water than RC-South (here).  In RC-East, according to TSgt Laidlaw, the wells have produced 45-200 gpm (gallons per minute), whereas the first well (of two) on Frontenac was 750 feet deep and trickles at 6gpm.  According TSgt Laidlaw, for each soldier on a base like Frontenac, about 20 gallons per day can be needed, though use can vary widely.  And so that 6gpm is only enough for maybe 400-500 soldiers, depending on many factors, such as if showers and toilets are used.

This team is stationed at Hurlburt Field, Florida.  Laidlaw said that in Florida they can drill a 120’ well in maybe a couple hours, but in Afghanistan that could take many days.  Afghan well water is tested for contaminants, said Laidlaw, and so far the RED HORSE wells have been free of manmade pollutants, but contains naturally occurring substances like manganese.  No harmful microorganisms have been found and the crew decontaminates the gear to prevent contaminating aquifer.  Laidlaw said there are many aquifers but RED HORSE doesn’t take from the shallow water because the Afghans tap shallow.   Nevertheless, Afghan wells can be hundreds of feet deep and are hand-dug wells that can look like shafts to Hell.

No geological surveys have been done here since the 70s, he said, and so part of the job is to collect data.  I asked Nathan if he ever struck black gold like in the Beverly Hillbillies, and Laidlaw said no, but they did find copper in RC-East.  Chinese are already here for the copper.

Interesting sources have told me that the QST (Quetta Shura Taliban) in Pakistan are worried about losing the Arghandab River Valley to “the foreigners,” which of course is us.  There have been intercepts, I am told, wherein local leaders complain to the Taliban that we are beginning to provide substance while the Taliban is failing to provide anything more than violence, though in some places the Taliban are known to supply justice quicker and cheaper than can be had from the Afghan government.  This battle for Arghandab (really for Kandahar) is far from won, but it appears that despite our own fumbling, we are at least outpacing the enemy.  Though this well is for FOB Frontenac, water remains a perpetual concern for Afghans.

The 1-17th Infantry at Frontenac asked RED HORSE if they could leave base to check local wells that had been built over recent years by NGOs.  I’ve seen these wells in different provinces.  Apparently thousands of small wells costing probably millions of dollars must have been installed by NGOs since the war began.  Yet many (or most in some areas) already do not work due to simple parts that have broken.

THE END

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The Battle for Kandahar: Part I

FOB Frontenac, Afghanistan
28 March 2010

Under an early morning sky, a red glow is cast from the lights on an Air Force water drilling rig.  A new MATV, or “MRAP All Terrain Vehicle,” is being deployed to Afghanistan to combat homemade bombs, the favorite weapon of the Taliban.

The 1-17th has lost 22 soldiers on this tour but, has inflicted far more on the enemy.  It appears that U.S. forces have gained the initiative in the Arghandab River Valley (ARV).  The ARV is crucial human and physical terrain for the unfolding Battle of Kandahar.

The Battle for Kandahar has begun.  The face of this battle is not one of sudden fury but a process, a complex struggle for legitimacy between local Taliban governance and Kabul rule.

A scent of weakness is in the air.  The Taliban remain deadly and capable – yet they seem to be losing the initiative.  “Shaping Operations” are underway.  Special Operations Forces are picking off and collecting key Taliban leaders.  With our increase in troops, the Taliban must spend more time on self-defence, deducting from their capacity for offensive operations.

This year, 2010, is particularly crucial for the future of Afghanistan.  The fight is on for key physical terrain, politcal terrain, and information dominance.  Before Christmas, we will know who won the Battle for Kandahar.  Who wins this Battle likely will win the war.

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